This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm...

Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover. We find consistently for all performance measures including both stock...

Remuneration consultants are an integral part of the process of determining executive pay in large listed companies. This paper discusses the role of the consultants in the United Kingdom, United States and Canada, analyses their industry and the factors currently affecting it, and summarizes...

Die Finanzkrise befeuerte erneut die öffentliche Diskussion um die Vorstandsvergütung. Ein all-gemein geäußerter Kritikpunkt dabei ist die mangelnde horizontale Vergleichbarkeit. Trotz der öffentlichen Diskussion hierrüber gibt es jedoch bis dato im Wesentlichen nur anekdotische Evi-denz...

We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

Prior research shows that firms generating earnings growth by improving profitability create shareholder value, while firms generating earnings growth through investment destroy value. This paper examines whether compensation committees consider this while determining CEO compensation. We first...

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, US executive compensation has, once again, come under fire from regulators, politicians, the financial press, the general public, and some academics. Although the critiques are varied, many identify the level of pay and performance-based incentives as...

Since 2010 the German law allows for non-binding votes on management compensation by shareholders during the annual meeting. In a broad study covering all non-financial German Prime Standard firms we examine determinants affecting (i) the likelihood of a voting and (ii) the result of a vote. We...

Previous studies of relative performance evaluation (RPE) for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent...

This paper examines the effect of hierarchical pay structures on firm value in firms where CEOs are not the highest paid members of the top management teams. We find that the difference in pay between CEO and VPs benefits firm value only when CEO is the highest paid member of the top management...