We distinguish between discovery information and private foreknowledge in the valuation of initial public offerings of corporate securities. An underwriter gathers discovery information to value and price the issue. The issuing firm relies on this information to make the optimal investment...

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formation and duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partners in a joint venture to benefit from each other's knowhow. Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity to acquire part of its partner's knowhow. A party's increased...

This paper presents a possible explanation for the lack of permanence of the very high level of concentration of ownership that accompanies leveraged buyouts. It argues that some diffusion of ownership can be beneficial to shareholders by encouraging employees to enter into implicit contracts...

This paper provides an explanation for the increase in firm value observed upon spin-off that is based upon the transmission of information about the various assets (or divisions) of a firm from informed to uninformed investors. Spin-offs serve to transmit information from informed to uninformed...

This paper provides a common explanation for a variety of asset financing arrangements that are observed in practice, specifically leasing, secured debt, project finance without recourse, and vendor financing. Such arrangements are viewed as serving to allocate ownership of one or many assets to...

We present an information-based explanation for spinoffs. When the various divisions of a firm are spun off into several firms that have separate stock market listings, the number of traded securities increases. This makes the price system more informative. It improves the quality of the...

We seek to account for the very high levels of public debt recently reached in many OECD countries. We do so by assuming that governments do their utmost to stave off default, which occurs only when a government fails to muster the funds needed for debt service. This distinguishes our work from...

When should shareholders afford a manager the discretion to be opportunistic and when should they constrain him to be principled? We show that discretion is associated with lower powered incentives than is constraint: opportunism may put shareholder capital at risk; shareholder can lessen that...