Political control of firms is prevalent across the world. Evidence suggests that firms profit from political connections, and politicians derive benefit from control over firms. This paper investigates an alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit electorally from connected...

I examine the relationship between bank efficiency and market power to test the quiet life hypothesis for a sample of 419 Latin American commercial banks between 1985 and 2010. A two-stage least squares model with instrumental variables controls for the simultaneous relationship between...

This paper investigates what predicts corporate governance in emerging markets. Specifically, we examine what predicts governance changes and the level of governance itself. To conduct this study, we utilize a unique dataset from AllianceBernstein that consists of monthly firm-level corporate...

This paper investigates the long-term impact of domestic and international acquisitions, initiated by Russian firms, on their operating performance. In general, acquisitions can be associated with synergy gains, internalization advantages, and higher market power. Acquisitions, however, may also...

Shareholder agreements are contracts that govern the relationship among different shareholders in a firm. This article uses a unique dataset to analyze shareholder agreements in listed companies and shows how they affect firm valuation. While shareholder agreements may be used to expropriate...

Using firm level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership concentration on post-M&A performance of firms. Our analysis has implications for both the M&A literature, which emphasises the role of agency conflict between managers and owners of widely held companies as a key reason for...

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for...

We identify two opposing effects of issuing equity with tag-along rights that secure an equal price in the event of a takeover. First, the anti-self dealing effect commits controlling owners to sell only to new owners that increase shareholder value. Second, the rent transfer effect shifts rents...

This paper investigates the selling process of firms acquired by private equity versus strategic buyers. In a single regression setup we show that selling firms choose between formal auctions, controlled sales and private negotiations to fit their firm and deal characteristics including...

We study the operating, financial, and ownership structure characteristics of newly listed firms which become acquisition targets shortly after their initial public offerings. We examine whether such firms get acquired because of their successful performance or as an alternative to delisting. We...