We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but...

This experimental study is concerned with the impact of the timing of the resolution of risk on investment behavior, with a special focus on the role of affect. In a between-subjects design, we observe the impact of a substantial delay of risk resolution (2days) on investment choices. Besides...

To maintain a chance of occasionally beating a stronger player in a competition waged over several fields, a weaker player should give up on some of the fields and concentrate resources on the remaining ones. But when do weak players actually do this? And which fields do they give up when the...

We investigate one possible explanation for observed rates of corrupt behavior namely that individual decision makers who frequently engage in illegal actions may underestimate the overall probability of being caught. This might in particular be true for petty corruption where small amounts of...

The results of a new experiment show that the Allais paradox (or, more generally, the common consequence effect) gets reversed, i.e. fanning-in choice patterns significantly outnumber fanning-out choice patterns. Revealed indifference curves fan in along the horizontal axis and hypotenuse of the...

Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is widely considered to be the most successful descriptive theory for decision making under risk and uncertainty. Sophisticated methods have been developed to reliably elicit CPT parameters on an individual basis. The aim of this paper is to analyze whether such...

Recent research suggests that while betrayal aversion may have negative effects, the presence of betrayal-averse agents is beneficial in reducing trustees’ willingness to betray trust. In light of this, many common knowledge institutions may have adopted rules and features which mitigate the...

In this laboratory experiment, we show that people incorporate irrelevant group information when evaluating others. Individuals from groups that perform badly on average receive low evaluations, even when it is known that the individuals themselves perform well. This group-bias occurs both in a...

When the performances of agents are correlated (because of a common random component), contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank-order tournaments and piece-rate schemes. Although the theoretical advantage of such...

We study portfolio diversification in an experimental decision task, where asset returns depend on a draw from an ambiguous urn. Holding other information identical and controlling for the level of ambiguity, we find that labeling assets as being familiar or from the homeland of subjects...