This paper identifies the various channels that give rise to a “sovereign-bank nexus” whereby the financial health of banks and sovereigns is intertwined. We find that banks and sovereigns are linked by three interacting channels: banks hold large amounts of sovereign debt; banks are...

We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through,...

This paper identifies the various channels that give rise to a "sovereign-bank nexus" whereby the financial health of banks and sovereigns is intertwined. We find that banks and sovereigns are linked by three interacting channels: banks hold large amounts of sovereign debt; banks are protected...

We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks' internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by...

We find that capital in the range of 15–23 percent of risk-weighted assets would have been sufficient to absorb losses in the vast majority of historic banking crises in advanced economies. Further capital increases would have had only marginal effects on preventing additional crises....

The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank's capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or...