Motivated by ongoing debates on investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) and its documented decline and disappearance in the U.S., we investigate the determinants of ICFS. Using firm-level data across 41 countries for the 1993–2013 period, we document an important role of asset tangibility in...

We study pay spillovers within the network of peer compensation benchmarking and show that these can reconcile growth differences and convergence in CEO compensation. Specifically, compensation of a small group of prominent, highly-central network firms is shown to have a substantial spillover...

We hypothesize that firms' attempts to reduce litigation risk can worsen financial report readability: as firms strive for disclosure accuracy and thoroughness, reports increase in size and complexity. Readability deteriorates with management exposure to securities class actions at the current...

We provide evidence on the effects of criminal/corrupt politicians on firm value and investments. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we focus on close elections to establish a causal link between election of criminal-politicians and firms' value and investment decisions. We utilize...

We use a novel database to study timeliness of hedge-fund monthly performance disclosures. Managers engage in strategic timing: poor monthly returns are reported with delay, sometimes clustered with stronger subsequent performance, suggestive of ‘performance smoothing'. We posit that...

We contend that the confluence of portfolio similarity and correlated liquidity shocks within mutual fund styles can exacerbate fund exposure to liquidity risk. We find that mutual funds mitigate such liquidity risk exposure by systematically reducing portfolio overlap with peer funds when their...

This paper develops a theory of organization based on the benefits and costs of internal capital markets. A central assumption is that the transaction cost of raising external funds is greater than the cost of internal funds. The benefit of internal resource allocation is that it gives the firm...

Successful private equity managers have funds that are often oversubscribed and provide persistent abnormal returns. Why don't successful managers increase fund size or fees? We argue that managers want to attract high quality entrepreneurs, while entrepreneurs want to match with high ability...