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Computing Integral Solutions of Complementarity Problems

Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

In this paper an algorithm is proposed to find an integral solution of (nonlinear) complementarity problems. The … algorithm starts with a nonnegative integral point and generates a unique sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying … dimension. Conditions are stated under which the algorithm terminates with a simplex one of whose vertices is an integral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137267

A Simple Algorithm for Solving Ramsey Optimal Policy with Exogenous Forcing Variables

Chatelain, Jean-Bernard - 2019

This article presents an algorithm that extends Ljungqvist and Sargent's (2012) dynamic Stackelberg game to the case of … in order to obtain impulse response functions and welfare. The algorithm presented, however, enables the computation of a … sector's predetermined and "jump" variables. The algorithm is applied on the new-Keynesian Phillips curve as a monetary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901171

A simple algorithm for solving ramsey optimal policy with exogenous forcing variables

Chatelain, Jean-Bernard; Ralf, Kirsten - 2017

This algorithm extends Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) algorithm of Stackelberg dynamic game to the case of dynamic …. Forward-looking variables are also optimally anchored on forcing variables. This simple algorithm calls for already programmed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011724201

Feedback Nash Equilibria for Descriptor Differential Games Using Matrix Projectors

Reddy, Puduru Viswanadha - 2011

In this article we address the problem of finding feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic differential games defined on descriptor systems. First, we decouple the dynamic and algebraic parts of a descriptor system using canonical projectors. We discuss the effects of feedback on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131491

Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in the Non-Cooperative Infinite-Planning Horizon LQ Game

Engwerda, Jacob C. - 2012

In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on his own. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104566

The Optimal Linear Quadratic Feedback State Regulator Problem for Index One Descriptor Systems

Engwerda, Jacob C. - 2008

In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722823

Perfection and stability of stationary points with applications to noncooperative games

Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu - 2002

converges to X in a continuous way.We also discuss several applications in noncooperative game theory. We first show that two … symmetric proper equilibrium. Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327822

Method for throughput maximization of multiclass networks with flexible servers

Naumov, Valeriy; Martikainen, Olli - 2011

In this paper, we study the throughput of multiclass networks featuring several types of flexible servers as well as general constraints both on the number of servers having the same skills and on the number of servers allowed at each station. Each job class is characterized by its processing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388996

Market power in water markets

Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2011 - This version: May 2011

Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380731

Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium with Default Penalties

Qin, Cheng-Zhong - 2009

The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can be applied to uniquely select any competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158128