Este documento evalúa la regulación vigente relacionada con la inversión de los recursos de los Fondos de Pensiones Obligatorios (FPO), para lo cual se analiza el perfil de eficiencia del sistema dadas sus actuales restricciones. De acuerdo con los resultados obtenidos, se observa que el...

A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

Bu çalışmada portföy büyüklüğünün A Tipi yatırım fonlarının performansı üzerindeki etkileri zaman serisi regresyon yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmada 7 yıllık dönemde (01.01.1998—31.12.2004) sürekli faaliyette olan 40 adet A Tipi yatırım fonuna ait aylık...

This article examines the locational dynamics of the institutional investment advisory industry in the United States, 1983-1996, focusing on the factors and firm characteristics that account for institutional investment management firms' location. The institutional investment advisory industry,...

Pension fund managers have devised ways to effectively skirt the rule that limits them to acquiring no more than 30 percent of the shares eligible to vote for the directors of a corporation. It’s time for regulators to enforce the rule or eliminate it entirely, thereby giving pension funds a...

This paper examines the technical efficiency of Argentinean pension funds management companies using a random stochastic frontier model to rank the pension funds management companies, taking into account heterogeneity in the data. The empirical findings reveal that efficiency measures have a...

The creeping stock market collapse eroded the wealth of funded pension systems. This led to political tensions between generations due to the fuzzy definition of property rights on the pension funds wealth. We argue that this problem can best be resolved by the introduction of generational...

We develop a principal-agent model based on a sequential game played by a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. The model shows that investors’ perceptions of the fund market play the key role in the fund’s fee-setting mechanism. The managers’...