This paper extends the investigation of the effect of managerial motives on hedging policy. I utilize a proxy variable that incorporates CEO incentives to increase risk relative to incentives to increase stock price. The variable is directly measured using observed characteristics of CEO...

I analyze the value of a nonstandard call option that allows the holder to purchase an underlying asset at a discount proportional to the asset's market price. Several applications for this type of option exist, including its use in employee compensation contracts. I derive the value of this...

I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in...

SYNOPSIS: The compensation committee of Level 3 Communications will soon meet to re-evaluate the indexed executive stock option plan used to compensate its top managers and other employees. This review takes place within the context of a troubled telecommunications industry; like many firms in...

We employ a certainty-equivalence framework to analyze the cost, value and pay/performance sensitivity of non-tradable options held by undiversified, risk-averse executives. We derive quot;Executive Valuequot; lines, the risk-adjusted analogs to Black-Scholes lines. We show that distinguishing...

This paper studies incentives in a dynamic contracting framework of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, while shareholders choose initially optimal leverage and ex-post optimal default policies. Notably, a resource constraint that binds the...

We propose a new framework to value employee stock options (ESOs) that captures multiple exercises of different quantities over time. We also model the ESO holder's job termination risk and incorporate its impact on the payoffs of both vested and unvested ESOs. Numerical methods based on Fourier...

Empirical evidence shows that backdating of executive stock option grants was prevalent, particularly at firms with highly volatile stock prices. Executives who have the opportunity to backdate should take this into account in their valuation. We quantify the value to a risk averse executive of...

Using a utility-maximization framework, I show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted. Keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed, granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does...