We analyse the results of a laboratory experiment on expectation formation. Participants were asked to predict prices in an artificial single-good economy, and were paid according to their forecasting accuracy. Thirteen markets, with six subjects each, were created, in two different treatments....

The experiment engaging 50 participants was performed to model and identify the determinants of the players’ risky behavior. Here, a questionnaire and a bimatrix game containing the negative/zero payoffs were used to identify the players’ motives to play risky strategies. Besides the...

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such models...

A prominent finding in the literature on gender competition is that women are less inclined to compete in comparison to men. In this paper, we conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the relevance of beliefs about the sex of potential competitors on men’s and women’s decision to enter...

In reciprocal interactions, both genuine kindness and self-interested material gain may motivate socially beneficial actions. The paper presents results from two experiments that distinguish the role of perceived motives in reciprocal decision making from the role of outcomes or perceived...

We study the emergence of bubbles in a laboratory experiment with large groups of individuals. The realized price is the aggregation of the forecasts of a group of individuals, with positive expectations feedback through speculative demand. When prices deviate from fundamental value, a random...

This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring process of expectations. We conduct a game experiment and measure the convergence of inflation expectations as well as the impact of credible targets in central banking. In addition, we evaluate the idiosyncratic variables of our...

We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In combination with the finding that...

Using the results of a pre-registered online experiment, this paper examines how information about a corruption in a group can affect intergroup relations. Corruption indices are not only a valuable tool for investors and policymakers to make informed decisions, but can also lead to statistical...