We examine the extent to which individual monitoring mechanisms enhance firm performance and shareholder value. We use a sample of Australian firms, from 1994 to 2003, to analyze the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. This provides a long time series of governance...

Using a sample of large Australian firms from 1994 to 2003, we show that variation in firm-level corporate governance mechanisms plays an important role in explaining a firm's cost of capital. Our empirical results show that greater insider ownership, the presence of institutional blockholders...

While financial institutions' aggregate investments have grown substantially across world equity markets, the size of their individual shareholdings, and ultimately their incentive to monitor, can be limited by the free-rider problem, investment regulations and a preference for diversification...

Using data from 44 countries, we document a new channel through which a family business group's internal capital market supports its members. We find that groups use internal capital to incubate difficult-to-finance projects, making it feasible for them to rapidly scale up, thus facilitating...

Using a carefully-constructed global dataset of family business groups, we show that group affiliation moderates corporate investment declines experienced in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. During this period, group internal capital market activity intensifies. The investment activity of group...