The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers...

In revisiting apparent contradictions within the Supreme Court's decision in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, this article illustrates a significant evolution in the jurisprudence – challenging the applicability of both shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory. In rejecting these...

In a large sample of U.S. M&As over 1990-2007 we find that value is created when risk-takers absorb risk-avoiding target firms, but it is destroyed when bidders with a conservative investment policy takeover risk-taking target firms. This value effect is particularly pronounced when bidders are...

Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers' incentive to invest (strong governance tightens managerial freedom and weak governance loosens...

In a networked and digital age, we need to rethink the structure of the modern corporation. In order to survive and grow, corporations must operate with a new set of assumptions and principles in order to remain relevant, competitive, and successful. Consider the growing number of technology...

This paper examines the relationship between profit maximization and sustainability within the framework of the life cycle phenomenon for a corporation. It appears a pattern becomes the norm regarding business entities as well as other organizational forms regarding sustainability

Using a dataset of 28,635 firms in 45 countries, this study investigates the motivations for family-controlled business groups. We provide new evidence consistent with the argument that particular group structures emerge not only to perpetuate control, but also to alleviate financing constraints...

The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of...

Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several...