While other parts of the new institutional economics (e. g. principal agent theory,transaction cost theory) have already been applied to co-operative researchwith some success, property rights theory has as yet been only rarelyused in this regard. At the same time, the traditional structure of...

The tasks as well as the types of co-operatives within an economy have continuously been discussed for nearly two hundred years. Since the days of Owen, the principles as well as the appearance of co-operatives have been heavily disputed. This became evident by the controversy between Huber,...

The relationship between executive pay and corporate financial performance con-tinues to attract wide academic, media and policy attention. The very high salariesenjoyed by senior executives in corporations primarily in the North American coun-tries are often contrasted with the relatively low...

Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungsund Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte...

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

This article provides a non-technical survey on recent topics in the theory of contracts. The hold-up problem is presented and the incomplete contracts approach is discussed. Emphasis is put on conceptual problems and open questions that await further research.

This paper studies internal organization of a firm using an incomplete contracting approach a la Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole. The two key ingredients of our model are externalities among tasks that require coordination, and investment in task-specific human capital. We compare three...

In this paper we incorporate the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analyzing the mechanisms of governance of sustainable development. The...

This paper analyzes the role of the initial allocation of ownership rights in transactions where parties make relationship-specific investments and contracts are incomplete. If there is high mutual dependence in production, the initial allocation of ownership rights is irrelevant. This result...

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analyzing and improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamic of agriculture....