After a large bank merger the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively,...

Director selection is crucial in corporate governance, but little is known about the relative importance of individual director attributes in the selection process. We examine the motives for director selection using the empirical setting of mergers, which offers a well-defined pool of...

This paper examines the debt underwriting relationship for banks. Publicly-traded investment and commercial banks (“banks”) are unique as they are the only firms capable of underwriting their own securities. In nearly 30% of their debt issuances, banks hire another underwriter and do so...

This paper examines the anticipated components of bidder returns by focusing on the banking industry around the passage of interstate deregulation (Riegle Neal Act of 1994). Overall, firms that became bidders after Riegle Neal have large significant positive returns during its passage. Moreover,...

We examine the impact of creditor control rights on corporate acquisitions. Nearly 75% of loan agreements include restrictions that limit borrower acquisition decisions throughout the life of the contract. Following a financial covenant violation, creditors use their bargaining power to tighten...

We study the utility industry from 1980 to 2004 to discern the time series impact of industry shocks and their relation to mergers as modeled by Gort (1969) and Jensen (1993). Our sample period permits tests of the effect of utility deregulation in 1992 and related industry shocks on the rate of...

After a large bank merger the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively,...

We examine whether firms utilize governance systems and increased monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we expect regulated firms to use less monitoring if regulation substitutes for governance. Using data...

We find evidence that aggregate funding conditions play an instrumental role in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Funding conditions impact the benefits, participants and the number of deals transacted and this impact extends well beyond merger waves. Specifically, when aggregate funding...