We experimentally examine how employees' employment horizons (long or short) and the performance measures in their incentive contracts (forward-looking or contemporaneous) affect employee effort allocation and performance. Consistent with economic theory, we find that the decision-influencing...

We find that fixed effects related to the location of a firm's headquarters explain variation in broad based option grants after controlling for industry effects and firm characteristics traditionally known to affect option granting. Location matters because of local labor market conditions and...

This study provides the first systematic examination of the compensation contracting relevance of sales revenue. We document an increasing temporal trend in the explicit use of sales revenue as a performance measure in CEO annual bonus contracts, which is mirrored by a similar increase in the...

For cash flows in perpetuity without growth, analysts typically use the following formula for the return to levered equity Ke.lt;brgt;lt;brgt;Ke = Ku + (Ku shy; Kd)(1 shy; T)D/E (1) lt;brgt;lt;brgt;where Ku is the return to unlevered equity, Kd is the cost of debt, T is the tax rate, D is the...

In the empirical estimation of the relation between CEO pay and both firm and peer performance, researchers typically include conventional accounting-based measures that reflect firm performance net of executive pay expense. We analytically show that when firms evaluate CEO performance relative...

Value based performance measures are intended to capture increases in shareholder wealth. At the same time they have to measure the realization of the returns initially planned for. To provide incentives for management to act in the interest of owners, bonus payments are often based on these...