This paper determines the structural shocks that shape a firm's first year by estimating a structural model of firm growth, learning, and survival using monthly sales histories from 305 Texas bars. We find that heterogeneity in firms' pre-entry scale decisions accounts for about 40% of their...

Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross-subsidization mechanisms like revenue-sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports...

The empirical literature on mergers, market power and collusion in differentiated markets has mainly focused on methods relying on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we suggest a novel approach that allows for the detection of collusive behaviour among a group of firms...

This paper determines the structural shocks that shape a firm's first year by estimating a structural model of firm growth, learning, and survival using monthly sales histories from 305 Texas bars. We find that heterogeneity in firms' pre-entry scale decisions accounts for about 40% of their...

The distribution of firm sizes is known to be heavy tailed. In order to account for this stylized fact, previous studies have focused mainly on growth through investments in a company's own operations (internal growth). Thereby, the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on the firm size...

We consider market dynamics in a reduced form model. In the simplest version, there are two investors and several small noninvesting firms. In each period, one investor can acquire a small firm, the other investor decides about market entry. After that all firms play an oligopoly game. We derive...

Divestitures have received little attention in ex-post evaluations of mergers. In partial remedy we simulate the effects of the Carlsberg-Pripps merger in the Swedish beer market and compare the predicted outcomes with those observed ex-post. There are no important price increases following the...

I set up an endogenous merger model in which, whenever fi rms agree to join in a coalition, the new entity acquires the leadership in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. I first explore the case of a single merger and show that, despite being such merger pro table irrespective of the number of...

Double moral hazard problems are prevalent in merger remedies. We consider a holdup problem in which two merging parties forced to sell an asset to a potential buyer, both engage in relationship-specific investments sequentially in order to prepare for an asset transfer. We show that an option...