This study investigates the effect of bank ownership on lending and firm investment efficiencies to give reasons for the mixed evidence that exists on the impact of bank ownership on firm performance. Using China's listed firms as an example, we find that bank ownership reduces the efficiency of...

This paper investigates pay dispersion and its effects on firm performance in China's listed firms. Due to weak investor protection and an inefficient legal system, China is expected to have a lower level of corporate governance. In this weak institutional environment, we argue that awarding...

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that managers' career concerns can serve as an important source of implicit economic incentives. We examine how incentives for political promotion are related to compensation policy and firm performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find...

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow...

This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in...

This study investigates the effect of banks' dual holding on bank lending and firms' investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than...

We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but...

We show that productivity at both the firm and employee (i.e., analyst and inventor) level temporarily declines upon announcements of takeover rumors that do not materialize. Such speculative news may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and...