We study corporate performance during and after the Great Depression for all industrial firms on the NYSE. Our first goal is to identify the factors that contribute to business insolvency and valuation during the period 1928 to 1938. To this end, we examine factors such as debt policy,...

The standard analysis of corporate governance is that shareholders vote in the ratios that firms choose, such as one-share-one-vote. But if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the...

We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find...

This paper investigates the effect of regulation that mandates open access to information on managers' disclosure choices and investors' reactions to disclosures. The recently passed Regulation FD (Reg FD) requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available. Using a sample of firms...

This paper examines the economic consequences of a regulatory change mandating OTCBB firms to comply with reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This change substantially increases mandated disclosures for firms previously not filing with the SEC. We document that the...

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., quot;openquot;conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision...

Using data from private placement contracts, we analyze relationships between investors and issuers, and their impact on corporate governance and performance. Most investors have a relationship with the issuer pre-placement and many new relationships are formed through the placement agreement....

In this manuscript, I examine the firm's ex ante cost of equity capital in the quarter before and the quarter after the filing of a shareholder securities lawsuit as well as in the quarter before and the quarter after the final resolution of the shareholder lawsuit. I find that the adjustment in...

How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations (implicit or...

This paper empirically examines the determinants of the choice between private and public offerings and expected price discounts by using a new database, which details the buyers and contracts of private placements in high-technology industries between 1986 and 1997. The estimates indicate that...