We study moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by participants at the end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a truthful budget was present. We find that participants who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme, and therefore built relatively high...

Given traditional agency theory assumptions and unobservable effort in a single-period setting, a moral hazard arises in which the agent is expected to shirk and provide the miminal possible effort after contracting with the principal. Traditional solutions to this agency problem include paying...

Researchers have questioned whether individual differences in moral reasoning might partly account for the variation in auditor misreporting behavior documented in prior experimental-markets research in auditing. In the first experimental market study to directly test the relation between moral...

This paper reviews, synthesizes, and critiques the capital market literature examining trading volume around earnings announcements and other financial reports. Our purposes are to assess what we have learned from examining trading volume around these announcements and to suggest directions for...

Researchers in accounting and economics have established that financial controls can diminish intrinsic motivation in the subordinate when they are intentionally imposed by the superior. We study the ability of a non-financial control to generate a similar crowding out effect on honest reporting...

This study examines whether differential interpretation of earnings announcements is affected by earnings and firm characteristics. We find that Kandel and Pearson's (1995) forecast measures of differential interpretation are: 1) negatively related to earnings predictability, firm size, and...

In agency theory, offering a flat salary contract under unobservable effort creates a moral hazard problem because the agent is motivated to shirk and provide less than a previously agreed-upon level of effort. We examine a moral solution to this moral hazard problem. In particular, we present a...