We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. General human capital...

A recent information design literature focuses on the value to buyers of acquiring strategically-designed information about their valuation to induce a monopolist to set lower prices. We highlight the value of commitments to not acquire information if excessively high prices are offered, thereby...

We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey public information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (1) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium...

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize total wages of graduates. Job placement and wages hinge on a firm's productivity assessment given a student's...