We analyze a hand-collected dataset of 1682 executive compensation packages at 34 firms included in the main German stock market index (DAX) for the years 2009-2017 in order to investigate the impact of the 2009 say on pay legislation. The findings provide important insights beyond the German...

When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor...

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

Many believe that deliberative democracy, where individuals discuss alternatives before voting on them, should result in collectively superior outcomes because voters become better informed and decisions are justified using reason. These deliberations typically involve a moderator, however,...

This study examines whether and how anticorruption efforts may mitigate the risk of corporate fraud. Based on a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms over the period of 2008 to 2017, we find that anticorruption efforts reduce the likelihood of fraud commission and increase the likelihood of...

Based on the optimal board independence theory, we analyze how Spanish listed firms determine the presence of genuine and gray independent directors. We classify independents as gray whenever they do not satisfy formal independence requirements. Given the findings in previous literature, this...

We provide a lower-bound estimate of the undetected share of corporate fraud. To identify the hidden part of the "iceberg," we exploit Arthur Andersen's demise, which triggered added scrutiny on Arthur Andersen's former clients and thereby increased the detection likelihood of preexisting...