Competition in a multi-unit auction is measured both by the number of bidders and by the relative size of their demands, compared to the number of units on sale. For the same degree of competition (identical aggregate demand and supply), we can observe different demand structures. Do they have...

The internet has facilitated the creation of new markets characterized by large scale, increased customization, rapid innovation and the collection and use of detailed consumer and market data. I describe these changes and some of the economic theory that has been useful for thinking about...

La subasta es el mecanismo fundamental por medio del cual el Banco Central de Bolivia (BCB) ejecuta sus operaciones de mercado abierto, instrumento principal de su política monetaria. Este mecanismo es utilizado también en la colocación de valores para financiamiento fiscal. Luego de varios...

This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in the firstprice multi-unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where bidders submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. We show that submitting a combination bid...

The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...

In 2010 sponsored search advertisements generated over $12 billion in revenue for search engines in the US market and accounted for 46% of online advertising revenue. A substantial portion of this revenue was generated by the sale of search keywords using auction mechanism. We analyze a...

Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or...

This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction...

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at which industry profits decrease with repeated entry is not too large, at the unique solution either a single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage,...