We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds over 1988-1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when the increases in investment advisor's...

We study 67 rights offerings by closed-end funds over 1988-1994 and gauge their impact on the fund's shareholders and managers. We find that funds conduct rights offerings while they are trading at a premium, reverts to a discount after the offering. Theories of asymmetric information about...

We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds from 1988–1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when increases in the investment advisor's...

In 1990, Pennsylvania enacted Senate Bill 1310 which contains five provisions designed to make takeovers prohibitively expensive. Firms were permitted, however, to Opt out of some or all of the law's provisions. We examine the relation between the opt-out decision and attributes of corporate...

In 1990, Pennsylvania enacted Senate Bill 1310, containing five provisions designed to make takeovers prohibitively expensive but allowing firms to opt out of some or all of the law's provisions. We find that firms that opted out of SB 1310 had lower insider control of voting rights and were...

To examine the role of executive compensation in corporate acquisition decisions, we compare the compensation of top executives in two groups of firms: firms undertaking large acquisitions and a control sample of non-acquirors. Before the acquisition, we find a positive relation between firm...