The primary role of equity compensation is to provide incentives to an effort-averse agent. Here, we show that the chosen level of equity incentives, when publicly disclosed, will also convey information about future earnings, causing two-way linkages between incentive compensation and financial...

This paper examines the role of equity-based incentives in fostering cross-business-unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business-unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm...

We study a situation in which a manager, whose ability to select good projects is unknown a priori, proposes a project for funding. The manager's superior can observe the information about project quality generated by the manager, but cannot observe the resources devoted by the manager to...

This paper examines the extent to which agency theory may explain CEO compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China during the 1980s. We find that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance decreases with the variance of performance. This is consistent with the prediction of a...

We consider the problem of moral hazard in the team of managers employed in a firm when the principal/firm owner can play an active role in determining team output. Unless the principal's compensation is non-decreasing in firm value there is an additional moral hazard problem since the principal...

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a...

We consider the problem of moral hazard in the team of managers employed in a firm when the principal/firm owner can play an active role in determining team output. Unless the principal's compensation is non-decreasing in firm value there is an additional moral hazard problem since the principal...

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows : firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a...

This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can...

This paper investigates the companies' behavioural response to information-based environmental policies. We perform a panel analysis for 39 big companies in 16 countries, in 3 polluting industries (oil & gas, chemicals, power generation) over a 5- year period (1993-1997) to check whether...