We empirically investigate whether corporate governance structure is different between focused and diversified firms, and whether any differences in corporate governance are associated with the value loss from diversification. We find that, relative to focused firms, CEOs in diversified firms...

We find that CEO compensation is less sensitive to stock-price performance the greater the extent of firm diversification. Our empirical evidence is consistent with a theory of managerial entrenchment as well as with a theory of optimal contracting between shareholders and managers. To...

Motivated by the potential for opportunistic behavior in pay decisions, recent SEC and IRS regulations essentially preclude inside directors from serving on a firm's compensation committee. In this paper, we examine whether greater compensation committee independence promotes shareholder...

Motivated by the potential for opportunistic behavior in pay decisions, recent SEC and IRS regulations essentially preclude inside directors from serving on a firm's compensation committee. We examine whether greater compensation committee independence promotes shareholder interests and whether...