Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Comparison of three related adverse selection models is presented. There is a selfish owner, a selfish employee, and an imperfectly altruistic employee. Model 1 involves hiring choice. The owner hires the altruist because he produces the same for less pay due to his positive externality for the...

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents' commitment to...

In a field experiment, we test the impact of performance-based incentives for community college instructors. We estimate that instructor incentives improve student performance on objective course exams by 0.2 standard deviations, increase course grades by 0.1 standard deviations, and reduce...

Using data from the online platform Glassdoor, we provide evidence that performance pay tracks an employee's role within the firm, exacerbates income inequality, and varies more than base pay across time, especially for job transitions. Employees in occupations requiring more interpersonal...

We develop the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce to address questions of job design and incentive compensation design. The model incorporates three novel features: (i) multitasking effort choice given a multidimensional incentive plan; (ii) salesperson's private information...

This paper examines how corporate governance reporting corresponds to actual conduct regarding severance payment caps for prematurely departing members of companies' executive boards in Germany. For this purpose, we first evaluate the declarations of conformity for all companies listed in the...

This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives...

Explicit relative performance awards (RPE) have become an important component of executive compensation. We calculate the value and incentives of explicit RPE awards and find that RPE awards that use a custom peer group are structured both in terms of the peer group and payout design to filter...

In recent years, scholars and policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the potential consequences of employment noncompetition agreements and to whether legislatures ought to reform the laws that govern the enforcement of these controversial contractual provisions. Unfortunately, much...