Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800...

Many firms use forced rating systems in which supervisors must evaluate employees according to a predefined distribution. We develop new theory suggesting that forced ratings are less likely to enhance performance when supervisors assess subjective dimensions of employee performance (e.g.,...

Recent regulation and legislation, along with the growing influence of compensation consultants and proxy advisors, have led to an increase in performance-contingent awards. A majority of these awards contain performance conditions tied explicitly to accounting measures. Both the structure of...

Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive...

Organizations often empower employees at all levels to propose innovation ideas that rely on their first-hand knowledge of their standard task (i.e. employee-initiated innovation). Many, however, struggle with motivating employees to develop innovative ideas that may benefit the firm, especially...

Investments in firm-specific human capital have come to play a central role in the value creation for most companies and organisations as job tasks have become ever more complex and demanding to carry out. Today successful performance of essential job tasks often necessitates highly specialised...

Many firms use forced rating systems in which supervisors must evaluate employees according to a predefined distribution. We develop new theory suggesting that forced ratings are less likely to enhance performance when supervisors assess subjective dimensions of employee performance (e.g.,...

Many of the events that trigger clawback provisions are associated with risky corporate policies and variable performance outcomes. We propose and test the hypothesis that clawback provisions motivate managers to reduce firm risk. Panel OLS, GMM-IV, and PSM models all indicate that clawback...

Corporate financial performance measured in terms of accounting-based ratios has been viewed as inadequate as firms began focusing on shareholder value as the primary long-term objective of the organization. Corporate managers have been facing a period where a new economic framework that better...