The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors' expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of...

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between...

Pownall, et. al. (1993) document that nearly 80% of their sample of voluntary management earnings forecasts are not precise point forecasts. Imprecise forecast forms include closed-interval forecasts (i.e., ranges), open-interval forecasts (i.e., minimums and maximums), and general impressions...

Using a sample of 856 management earnings forecasts, we provide evidence that managers release larger shock earnings forecasts in nontrading periods. Our results do not depend on whether the magnitude of the shock is measured exogenously (unexpected accounting earnings) or endogenously (security...

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between...