CEO compensation varies widely, even within industries. In this paper, we investigate whether differences in skill explain these differences in CEO pay. Using the idea that skilled CEOs should be more likely to continue prior good performance and more likely to reverse prior poor performance, we...

We study the effect of staggered boards (SBs) on managers' behavior and on long-run firm value using a natural experiment: a 1990 law that imposed a SB on all firms incorporated in Massachusetts. We find that the law led to an increase in Tobin's Q, increased investment in capital expenditure...

In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...

Proxy advisory and corporate governance rating firms play an increasingly important role in U.S. public markets. Proxy advisory firms provide voting recommendations to shareholders on proxy proposals and sometimes take an active role persuading management to change governance arrangements....

When a firm spins off a subsidiary, the parent managers create a governance structure for the spinoff and decide whether spinoff management will be protected by takeover defenses. We find evidence that agency costs at the parent firm level affect the adoption of takeover defenses for the...