We extend public goods game and design transboundary public goods game which players receive more information from the local group, and marginal return per capital (MPCR) is heterogeneous across local groups that high MPCR among local groups and low MPCR among counter groups. We experimentally...

This paper proposes a new communication protocol in coordination games with binary actions and Pareto-ranked equilibria, which comes from an option to delay. In the first period, players choose between committing to the risk-dominant (safe) action in the game or delaying their choices until a...

A large literature in behavioral economics has emphasized in the last decades the role of individual differences in social preferences (such as trust and altruism) and in influencing behavior in strategic environments. Here we emphasize the role of attention and working memory, and show that...

A large literature in behavioral economics has emphasized in the last decades the role of individual differences in social preferences (such as trust and altruism) and in influencing behavior in strategic environments. Here we emphasize the role of attention and working memory, and show that...

We investigate how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment interact to influence cooperation in social networks. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation and welfare, induces more forgiveness toward defectors, and promotes opportunistic play....

This paper studies the impact of continuous time interaction on two iconic coordination games: stag hunt and battle of the sexes in a laboratory environment and compare results to possible theoretical explanations. Experimental results show that subjects consistently coordinate better in...

Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical rel evance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...

Mixed-motive noncooperative games feature ambivalence in the competitive relation of the players and outcomes disobliging Nash equilibrium prescription. The Nash approach, ostensibly rational and self-maximizing, regularly advises strategy many players regard as counterintuitive or faulty. And...

Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature on infinitely repeated games has highlighted the primary role of self-interested strategic considerations in explaining outcomes. Using indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games, this paper...

Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people's uncooperative behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforcement. One as yet unanswered question is whether people collectively choose to interact with each other under the partner matching...