This paper shows that insider trading reduces outside searchers' trading profits and thus their incentive to search for information. This reduces social welfare since allocation decisions are made with less information. Non-mandatory disclosures are also socially undesirable for identical...

The authors investigate the choice between hiring syndicates through competitive bidding and negotiation. Making syndicates compete can result in inferior terms because of inefficiencies like less effective search, possibly less total search, and trapped bidders. Empirical results are consistent...

We posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which, in the short run, is in fixed supply. Hence, a sudden increase in demand for IPO financing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. Increased compensation results in reduced screening which encourages sub-marginal firms to...

We show that entrepreneurs may prefer to allow insider trading even when it is not socially optimal. We examine a model in which an insider/manager allocates resources on the basis of his private information and outside information conveyed through the secondary-market price of the firm's...