This survey reviews the economic thoughts about what and why do institutional market players lose because of the existing market frictions and particular financial market microstructures compared to walrasian markets. Within a unified microeconomic framework, we introduce the most common...

This survey reviews the economic thoughts about what and why do institutional market players lose because of the existing market frictions and particular financial market microstructures compared to walrasian markets. Within a unified microeconomic framework, we introduce the most common...

This paper examines effects of MiFID II on European stock markets. We study the effects of the new tick size regime, both intraday and in the closing auction. An increase (decrease) in tick size is associated with a decrease (increase) in intraday liquidity, but a more (less) stable market. In...

This paper studies the double auction (DA) mechanism in Ma and Li (2011) for a class of exchange economies. We extend their results to more general cases where sellers and buyers each form a complex time non-homogeneous Markovian chain, as specified in Ram et al. (2009), in the communication of...

Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later, rather than only now or never, their current `willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than is the demand curve. In consequence, markets...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Byesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partition.

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A model is presented where two market makers with two different information partitions compete in prices. At each stage a bid-ask auction between...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Bayesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partitions. At each...

Áttekintő tanulmányunkban arra keressük a választ, hogy mit és miért veszítenek az intézményi pénzügyi piacokon kereskedő szereplők a piaci súrlódások és az egyes piacok sajátos mikrostruktúrája következtében. Egységes elemzési keretben és jelölésrendszerben mutatjuk...

We study uniform price auctions using a dataset which includes individual bidders' demand schedules in Finnish Treasury auctions during the period 1992-99. Average underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may result from monopsonistic market power. We...