“Overbidding” with respect to risk-neutral Nash predictions in first-price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature. One possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a clear perception of probabilities, which causes...

The relationship between policyholders and an Islamic insurance (takaful) operator is in essence a principal-agent relationship. This paper analyzes the power of incentives offered to takaful operators in mitigating problems associated with such a relationship. These incentives include wakalah,...

The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...

We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive...

Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that offering extrinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people's willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this 'crowding out' phenomenon, using standard economic arguments. The...

In their recent paper Derigs and Marzban (2009) argued that Sharia’a-compliant strategies result in much lower portfolio performance than the conventional strategies. The main reason for their argument is of Sharia’a-compliance limits on the set of admissible investments. However, in the...

Allowing for a richer information structure than usual, we show that rational traders’ calculation with short-term price fluctuations may heavily influence their behaviour even if the interim price is not influenced by non-rational agents i.e. there is no noise trader risk. Instead, traders...

The author proves necessity of formation of the integrated system of the marketing information of innovative high school, considers methodical aspects formation of the integrated system of the marketing information of innovative high school, develops structure of the integrated system of the...

Economists argue that rich information environments and formal enforcement of contracts are necessary to prevent market failures when information asymmetries exist. We test for the necessity of formal enforcement to overcome the problems of asymmetric information by estimating the value of...

We model a competitive labor market populated by workers who are heterogeneous in wealth and skills, in which education plays a signaling role. We show that whenever the accumulation of factors of production such has technology results in a wider wage premium for skills over time – as it might...