We examine whether conflicts of interest with investment banking and brokerage induce sell-side analysts to issue optimistic stock recommendations and, if so, whether investors are misled by such biases. Using quantitative measures of potential conflicts constructed from revenue breakdowns of...

This paper studies changes in the information environment brought about by Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), which was implemented on October 23, 2000. FD now prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, non-public disclosures to favored investment professionals. FD, however, has a...

This paper examines how the quality of stock analysts' forecasts is related to conflicts of interest from investment banking and brokerage. We consider four aspects of forecast quality: accuracy, bias and frequency of revision of quarterly earnings forecasts, and relative optimism in long-term...

This article relates interim financial reporting frequency in a multiperiod Kyle framework to securities prices, trading volume, market liquidity, and analysts' information acquisition expenditures. The model supports conventional wisdom that more frequent interim reporting improves the...

With the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), market behavior around earnings releases displays no significant change in return volatility (after controlling for decimalization of stock trading) but significant increases in trading volume due to difference in opinion. Analyst...

With the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), market behavior around earnings releases displays no significant change in return volatility (after controlling for decimalization of stock trading) but significant increases in trading volume due to difference in opinion. Analyst...

Using data from the EDGAR era, we find a significant market reaction surrounding quarterly periodic reports only when their filing coincides with the first public disclosure of earnings, although that for 10-K reports is not subsumed by earnings releases. However, after eliminating incidence of...

On October 23, 2000, the SEC implemented a regulation that changed the way corporate managers interact with analysts and investors. Under Reg. FD, managers can no longer give individual guidance to analysts without simultaneously disclosing the information to the public. This paper examines the...

We examine the effect of Regulation FD on stock return volatility. Critics suggest FD has increased volatility by causing firms to (a) disclose less information, resulting in increased noise trading and pricing errors; or (b) substitute essentially continuous communication to the market through...

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., quot;openquot;conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision...