Using hand-collected compensation consultant data, we investigate whether compensation consultants exhibit distinct styles in the determination of CEO pay level and compensation structure. Our tests, which include the use of placebo samples that involve the scrambling of consultants as...

The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is...

This study examines the widespread belief that executive pay should reflect firm performance. We compile a hand-collected data set of compensation paid to executive directors of Dutch listed companies and analyze if executive compensation is indeed determined by firm performance. A variety of...

We study the impact of the size of a firm's board of directors on managerial incentives. We present a model where a risk-averse agent (the top management team) performs multiple tasks for a firm that is controlled by multiple principals (the board of directors) who differ in the relative value...

This study examines the widespread belief that executive pay should reflect firm performance. We compile a hand-collected data set of compensation paid to executive directors of Dutch listed companies and analyze if executive compensation is indeed determined by firm performance. A variety of...

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts...

We use compensation consultant turnover to investigate optimal or excessive CEO compensation recommendations by consultants. Prior literature contends that consultants issue outsized pay recommendations in order to achieve repeat business; we present evidence suggesting their interests are,...

To motivate managers to pursue shareholder interests, boards may design management compensation packages to reward managers for good firm performance. However, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that when CEOs are far from retirement, they have career concerns. In these cases, Gibbons and Murphy...

In this paper I examine the likelihood of CEO stock option repricing and its alternatives, namely option grant, stock grant, and do nothing. Multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to...

CEOs are insured that they will not be terminated frivolously when they expect to be given severance because it becomes expensive for the board to terminate the CEO. Because severance makes termination initially costly, CEOs can create barriers to internal governance by making it even more...