This paper examines the labor market for mutual fund managers and managers' responses to the implicit incentives created by their career concerns. We find that managerial turnover is sensitie to a fund's recent performance. Consistent with the hypothesis that fund companies are learning about...

This paper examines the agency conflict between mutual fund investors and mutual fund companies. Investors would like the fund company to use its judgement to maximize risk-adjusted fund returns. A fund company, however, in its desire to maximize its value as a concern has an incentive to take...

We examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. Using data from 1992-1994, we find that quot;terminationquot; is more performance-sensitive for younger managers. We identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination-performance relationship. The shape of the...

This paper examines the agency conflict between mutual fund investors and mutual fund companies. Investors would like the fund company to use its judgment to maximize risk- adjusted fund returns. A fund company, however, in its desire to maximize its value as a concern has an incentive to take...