In this study, I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Specifically, given that options provide both incentives to increase risk as well as stock price, firms must be cognizant that executives may increasingly...

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula...

The ability of standard executive stock options to incite managers to adequately select the assets of their firm has been extensively questioned by academics and practitioners. However, very few alternatives exist or have been proposed to better control the investment strategies of top managers....

We contribute to the previous literature on the use of derivatives by studying separately the determinants for profit seeking versus hedging in a sample of firms from four different Nordic countries. While the hedging motive clearly dominates, more than half of the firms in our sample give some...

This paper examines how an option plan that rewards managers for firm performance relative to some market or industry benchmark should be structured. Relative-performance-based compensation advocates contend that conventional stock options do not adequately discriminate between strong and weak...

This paper examines the issues and controversies over the question of whether executive stock options should be expensed and, if so, how option values should be determined. It identifies and clarifies the key questions and surveys and synthesizes the academic and trade literature. Illustrations...

This paper extends the investigation of the effect of managerial motives on hedging policy. I utilize a proxy variable that incorporates CEO incentives to increase risk relative to incentives to increase stock price. The variable is directly measured using observed characteristics of CEO...

Empirical evidence shows that backdating of executive stock option grants was prevalent, particularly at firms with highly volatile stock prices. Executives who have the opportunity to backdate should take this into account in their valuation. We quantify the value to a risk averse executive of...

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...

This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...