We study two governments, each considering whether or not to compete to attract a foreign monopoly firm into its own domestic market. The competition, should it occur, would involve offering incentives to the firm. The incentives, which are costly for the governments to provide, lower the firm...

Consider a financial market equilibrium with correlated firms and risk averse investors holding diversified portfolios. When an activist investor has the ability to perform value-enhancing activities in a single firm, and these activities increase with ownership, we show that optimizing behavior...

We consider agents in a country in an early stage of transition from a planned to a market economy. As the transition is in progress, the nature of the government's policies are unknown to the agents. Property rights once held by the state have already been transferred to the agents, with each...

We develop a method to evaluate shareholder activism when an activist targets firms whose shareholders are diversified portfolio holders of possibly correlated firms. Our method of evaluation takes the portfolios of all of the shareholders, including the activist, as its basis of analysis. We...

We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of government who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know policy choices that each government would make...

We investigate the claim made by proponents of the big-bang strategy that the establishment of property rights in an economy in transition creates its own demand for the enforcement of laws to protect those rights. Our model contains a government engaging in activities to accomplish objectives...