Two stylized facts are often used to characterize the economies in transition: an increase in the crime level and frequent government changes, where the party in power is replaced by another party with a different, and often opposite, ideological orientation. We investigate the impact on agents'...

We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of government who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know policy choices that each government would make...

We investigate the claim made by proponents of the big-bang strategy that the establishment of property rights in an economy in transition creates its own demand for the enforcement of laws to protect those rights. Our model contains a government engaging in activities to accomplish objectives...

We explore an overlooked aspect of the design of the Czech voucher privatization programme, namely, the consequences of allowing individuals to distribute their vouchers among the voucher privatization funds (VPFs). We develop and analyse a model of voucher privatization in which we study the...