We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay...

We examine whether the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team engenders a positive externality by curtailing stock price crash risk. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team and stock price crash risk....

Using transactions generally overlooked in the compensation literature—joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and spin-offs—we find that, beyond compensation for increases in firm size or complexity, chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their...

Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts...

Shareholder and public dissatisfaction with executive compensation has led to calls for an annual shareholder advisory vote on a firm's compensation pratices and policies, so-called "say on pay." Proposed federal legislation would mandate "say on pay" generally for US public companies. This...

Proxy advisory firms are independent, for-profit consulting companies that provide voting recommendations to individual and institutional investors. Research shows that these firms have significant influence on voting outcomes. Given this influence, it is important that investors ensure that the...

Shareholders of public companies are not responsible for designing executive compensation packages. Still, a shareholder vote on compensation is required in two circumstances: when a company wants to establish an equity-based compensation plan, and annually as part of the Dodd Frank requirement...

Using hand-collected compensation consultant data, we investigate whether compensation consultants exhibit distinct styles in the determination of CEO pay level and compensation structure. Our tests, which include the use of placebo samples that involve the scrambling of consultants as...

CEOs are insured that they will not be terminated frivolously when they expect to be given severance because it becomes expensive for the board to terminate the CEO. Because severance makes termination initially costly, CEOs can create barriers to internal governance by making it even more...