We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross list by comparing Canadian firms cross listed on U.S. stock exchanges to industry- and size-matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive...

Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening funds’ investment horizon, we find that affected funds influence portfolio firms to reduce the pay duration of their executives to incentivize them to also have shorter...

Using the details of vesting terms, we document that stock options granted in high investor sentiment periods tend to have shorter vesting periods and durations, and are more likely to vest completely or have a significantly larger fraction vested within one year of the grant date, relative to...

Keynote Address to the European Financial Management Association, London, June 2002This paper received the European Financial Management Readers' Choice Best Paper Award for 2004My intention today is to provide a way to understand some of what's currently happening in the world of finance and...

I present a novel dataset of over 4,000 firm-level repricings of executives and employees' stock options over the period 1987-2002. For a sub-sample of 587 repricings characterized by a homogeneous institutional environment, I investigate determinants and consequences of the structure of the...

Since academic scholars and the Wall Street Journal reported widespread evidence indicating that option grants to executives were backdated, an avalanche of news stories followed documenting this ever-widening corporate scandal. In this study we ask: quot;How do disclosures of backdating affect...

We study equity price reactions to compensation contracting in experimental markets. Motivated by research reporting positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans for executive managers, but postulating competing reasons as to why, we design an experiment that...

We study equity price reactions to compensation contracting in experimental markets. Motivated by research reporting positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans for executive managers, but postulating competing reasons as to why, we design an experiment that...

Motivated by research reporting positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans, we examine price reactions to compensation contracting in experimental markets. The design allows us to manipulate variables separately and study issues of adverse selection (sorting)...

Given that an owner cannot commit to her timing strategy under a manager's hidden action, we consider (i) how the owner's timing decisions to launch a project and to replace the manager or change a project are determined, and (ii) how the optimal compensation contract for the manager is...