This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King...

This paper studies inference in a continuous-time game where an agent’s decision to quit an activity depends on the participation of other players. In equilibrium, similar actions can be explained not only by direct influences, but also by correlated factors. Our model can be seen as a...

Results of a survey concerning the importance of quality management of the educational process among high officials of Czech universities and colleges are summarized in this article. Three of possible methods of quality management in the educational process are described here: Standardization...

In Rome, if you start digging, chances are you will nd things. We consider a famous complaint that justies the underdeveloped Roman metro system: \if we tried to build a new metro line, it would probably be stopped by archeological nds that are too valuable to destroy, so we would have wasted...

The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the Vector Autoregression (VAR)...

This paper focuses on a two-period OLG economy with public imperfect observability over the intergenerational cooperative dimension. Individual endowment is at free disposal and perfectly observable. In this environment we study how a new mechanism, we call Self-Commitment-Institution (SCI),...

This paper studies equilibrium selection via stochastic dynamics in the style of Young (Econometrica 61, 1993, 57-84), when the mistake probabilities are allowed to depend on their expected payoffs. Although any strict equilibrium can be selected with properly constructed state-dependent...

We consider a signalling game in which a population of receivers decide on the outcome by majority rule, sender and receivers have conflicting interests, and there is uncertainty about both players types. We model players rationality along the lines of recent findings in behavioral game theory....

This paper focuses on a two-period OLG economy with public imperfect observability over the intergenerational cooperative dimension. Individual endowment is at free disposal and perfectly observable. In this environment we study how a new mechanism, we call Self-Commitment-Institution (SCI),...

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can either mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately or reduce pollution collectively through public policy. The setting is that of a small open economy in which...