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How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037089
Under a contract, agents are not only held to honor the allocation as prescribed by a cost sharing mechanism but also a full description of allocated units and costs once production falls short. For agents leaving the cost sharing problem by taking their demanded units and prepaying the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209437
Progressivity, inequality reduction and merging-proofness are three well-known axioms in taxation. We investigate implications of each of the three axioms through characterizations of several families of taxation rules and their logical relations. We also study the preservation of these axioms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054571
A new concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions is discussed, analyzed, and related to the homonymous property within the rationing context. The class of additive and consistent mechanisms is isomorphic to the class of consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Consequently average and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058131
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334160
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427428
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785933
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187303
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571
The excessive compensation packages of CEOs of U.S. corporations in recent years have brought the issue of fairness to the foreground in economics. The conventional wisdom is that the free market for labor, which determines the pay packages, cares only about efficiency and not fairness. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147959