This paper examines the reliability of option fair value estimates in the presence of transaction costs. The Black Scholes Merton (BSM) framework assumes zero transaction costs and thus might not provide a reasonable approximation in this context. We investigate the model adjustments companies...

We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...

It is well documented in the empirical literature that employee stock options exercise behavior is driven by economic/rational factors as well as by psychological/behavioral factors. The latter include a set of behavioral biases affecting attitudes towards risk. Perhaps the most comprehensive...

This paper examines how an option plan that rewards managers for firm performance relative to some market or industry benchmark should be structured. Relative-performance-based compensation advocates contend that conventional stock options do not adequately discriminate between strong and weak...

In recent years several companies have offered employees the opportunity to transfer out-of-the-money options to a financial institution. This paper is a clinical study of a high-profile program offered by Microsoft in 2003. This program contained some complexities that likely made it...

Using a utility-maximization framework, I show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted. Keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed, granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does...

More than half of S&P 500 CEOs receive options annually, however extant valuation models have not accounted for portfolio considerations. We show the inability of executives to diversify means portfolio effects matter: exercise thresholds and shareholder costs are lower than for stand-alone...

We consider the optimal exercise of a portfolio of American call options in an incomplete market. Options are written on a single underlying asset but may have different characteristics of strikes, maturities and vesting dates.Our motivation is to model the decision faced by an employee who is...

Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...