Recent corporate governance reforms focus on the board's independence and encourage equity ownership by directors. We analyze the efficacy of these reforms in a model in which both adverse selection and moral hazard exist at the level of the firm's management. Delegating governance to the board...

Building on the managerial entrenchment literature, we develop and test a novel perspective on payout policy that integrates the influence of internal governance mechanisms, investment opportunities, management compensation, and monitoring by large shareholders. Our study incorporates both...

Is the decision to go public or private a stock-market-driven “sideshow” or does it have significant effects on investment and profitability? We address this issue using a comprehensive data set of private and public companies in the U.K. during 1996–2006. Firms with high...

We examine, both theoretically and empirically, top-management compensation in the presence of agency conflicts when shareholders have delegated governance responsibilities to a self-interested Board of Directors (BOD). We develop a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates the BOD as a...

Kenya has long had a reputation of being politically risky, manifested in corruption, uncertainty about policies, and the importance of political connections in doing business. Kenya began its economic liberalization in 1993. Reform picked up speed after a tightening of aid by donors on...

We theoretically and empirically investigate the role of information on the cross section of stock returns and firms' cost of capital when investors face estimation risk and learn from noisy signals of uncertain quality. The resultant equilibrium is an information-dependent conditional CAPM. We...