Showing 1 - 10 of 655,732
Fundamental choices are to be made when fashioning a system or combination of systems concerning multi-party and collective relief (see section II of this article). These include:economic access to justice (section III), opt-out 'class' litigation (notably the status of `representatives' suing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058392
Within the past decade, the EU has made significant steps in strengthening and harmonising the legal framework of capital markets. Despite passing and amending secondary legislation on this topic, it only partially addressed the issue of enforcement, leaving private enforcement an issue for its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014261793
Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003). In chapter 17, I consider the basic theory of litigation. Here I … chapter 18, I extend the basic theory of litigation, examining among other issues the bringing of negative value suits …, in chapter 19, I discuss several general aspects of the legal process not considered in the basic theory and its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088915
In an economic perspective, punitive damages and class actions can be viewed as sharing a common economic function – creating optimal deterrence. Building on Parisi and Cenini (2010), we study the effect of alternative procedural regimes on the effectiveness of punitive damages and class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138272
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055375
When firms collude and charge supra-competitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120107
This article translates and extends Becker (1968) from public law enforcement to private litigation by examining optimal legal system design in a model with private suits, signals of case strength, court error, and two types of primary behavior: harmful acts that may be deterred and benign acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772058
The conduct of adjudication is often influenced by motions––requests made by litigants to modify the course of adjudication. The question studied in this article is why adjudication should be designed so as to permit the use of motions. The answer developed is that litigants will naturally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011923694
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823162
Class actions aim to bring economies of scale to bear on legal proceedings, by joining cases that have a common cause of action against a common defendant into a single lawsuit leading to a judgment or settlement that binds the entire class. Legal procedures, lawyer time, evidence by experts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862625