Showing 1 - 10 of 680,031
Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to non-optimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713812
Why should political parties say what they do not want instead of saying what they want? In this paper, we introduce the concept of negative positioning into spatial models of voting and discuss its relevance as a campaigning tool in European multiparty systems. By negative positioning, we refer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314736
We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention when the probability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047178
We show how an outside party offering incentives to a committee can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. This contrasts with previous contributions--which ignore the possibility of outside influence--highlighting the advantages of using committees making decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014131716
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965090
We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to study how voter turnout and election outcomes are affected by the publication of exit polls on election day. We find that the introduction of an exit poll influences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659212
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379359
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343278
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, where each group is represented by a single person. Theoretical concepts suggest how the voting systems in such committees should be designed, but these abstract rules can usually not be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240053
This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243444