We study the role of peer groups in determining the structure and the total amount of executive compensation. Our analysis is based on a standard agency model in which the agent's reservation utility is related to the peer group used for performance evaluation. Our main result is that the...

In this paper, we study a setting where a firm (principal) is privately informed of the firm's potential and contracts with an agent to supply unobservable effort. We show it can be optimal for the firm to have loose monitoring in the sense that the monitoring system is less perfect than what is...

We consider a single-principal/multi-agent model to investigate the principal's preferences over delegated contracting. The analysis extends the single-agent/multi-task LEN model in Feltham and Xie (1994) to a multi-agent/multi-task context. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the...

When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so...

In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non-monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non-monotonicity of the...

Cost-based transfer pricing is used by many firms. However, there exist many cost-based methods that may be centralized or decentralized. If centralized, the firm's central office has discretion how accurately to measure the divisions' costs. In order to measure cost reliably, the firm must...

We consider a principal-agent model where the agent is hired to take an action on behalf of the principal. The agent can exert costly effort to learn the true state of the world. If he fails to discover the state, he can end an inquiry to the principal who then can exert (additional) costly...

We study the feasibility and desirability of integrating ethics with traditional principal-agent theory. After discussing common objections and potential benefits, we present a principal-agent model that incorporates ethics in a manner that maintains the essential features of the traditional LEN...

We develop a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are privately informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or in exploration activities. Excessive delegation lead agents to inefficiently herd into exploration in an attempt to boost their market value. The...

The use of fixed capital budgets is an empirically well-documented phenomenon in business practice. Whensoever some profitable investment opportunities cannot be realized, managers have to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency...