Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e, can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they...

We develop a model where overconfident investors overestimate their own signal quality but are skeptical of others'. Those investors who are initially uninformed believe that the early informed have learned little, leading the former investors to provide excess liquidity, which, in turn, causes...

This study shows that uncertainty about information does not strengthen momentum. If the behavioral models hold, and if uncertainty about information causes high-volatility momentum strategies to outperform low-volatility strategies, then this relation must hold on a relative level. Momentum...

We propose a rational model to explain time-series momentum. The key ingredient is word-of-mouth communication, which we introduce in a noisy rational expectations framework. Word-of-mouth communication accelerates information revelation through prices and generates momentum. Social interactions...

This paper expands on the existing literature on information asymmetry by testing if herding exists. We test herd behavior in a transparent and order-driven market using intraday data. We propose (1) a modification in the herding measure, (2) that investors tend to herd more based on fundamental...