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When a financial institution monitors firms that it finances, it acquires private information, creating a lemons problem when the institution needs financing. Since debt is less sensitive than equity to firm-specific information, holding debt improves the institution's liquidity. Debt's lower...
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The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, making them a central institution of economic growth. Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment. In contrast, in...
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We study whether the socially optimal level of stability of the banking system can be implemented with regulatory capital requirements in a multi-period general equilibrium model of banking. We show that: (i) bank capital is costly because of the unique liquidity services provided by demand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473633
This paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs, contrary to conventional wisdom. Separate financing dominates joint financing when risk-contamination losses--that are associated with the contagious default of a well-performing project...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969762
This paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs, contrary to conventional wisdom. Separate financing dominates joint financing when risk-contamination losses (associated to the contagious default of a well-performing project that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851458
Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005296217
Banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk, for example, a bank and a finance company, or a "good bank/bad bank" structure. Such "bipartite" structures may prevent risk shifting, in which banks misuse their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005214306